Invasion of Ukraine, D+22, SITREP (#202)

Today, March 18, 2022, is D+22 in the Russian Invasion of the Ukraine. The Principles of War, developed by Carl Von Clausewitz, a Prussian who fought in the Russian Army in the early 19th century against Napoleon, informs the study of war even today. As a US Army Field Manual states, the Principles “provide general guidance for conducting war and military operations... The Principles are the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine.” I’ll take a look at the Nine Principles of War and assess how both Ukraine and Russia have applied them. In addition, this article builds on the previous analysis from March 15, 2022 by updating the crowd sourced Battle Damage Assessment on both sides of the conflict from the Oryx website and providing an assessment on the impact of the war on both the Russian and Ukrainian forces.

Principles of War

There are nine Principles of War: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. Below is a brief description of each principle of war.

• Objective – Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable end.

• Offensive – Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

• Mass – Synchronize, align, and concentrate forces and effects at the decisive place and time.

• Economy of Force – Allocate minimum essential forces to secondary efforts. This is the opposite of mass.

• Maneuver – Maneuver is the deliberate movement of forces in relation to the enemy to gain an advantage.

• Unity of Command – For every objective, seek unity of command under one responsible commander and unity of effort.

• Security – Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.

• Surprise – Strike the enemy at a time, place, and manner for which he or she is unprepared.

• Simplicity – Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure their understanding. Everything in war is very simple, but the simple thing is difficult.

Evaluating the performance of Russia over the last 21 days, the Russian military has massed its forces along three main axis of advance, slowly managed to stay on the offensive, and stuck to a simple plan. On the other hand, the Russian military has struggled to maneuver their forces (they have remained road bound due to the mud), maintain security, and achieve surprise after the initial invasion.

Evaluating the performance of Ukrainian forces three weeks into the war, the Ukrainian military has done a good job of focusing on the objective (defend Ukraine and defeat the Russian invaders), surprising the Russian forces, using economy of force (think managing their scarce resources), and maintaining their ability to maneuver. On the other hand, the Ukrainian forces are are having difficulty massing since they are defending against three Russian axis of advance.

Jomini of the West has modified his maps to obscure the location of Ukrainian forces. Here is Jomini of the West’s depiction of Russia’s invasion plans:

Here is Jomini of the West’s map of the current situation (March 16, 2022). As he states “The third week of the war ends with failed Russian efforts to regain the strategic initiative in Kyiv, exposed to raids and ambushes in the Sumy Oblast, slow progress in the Donbas, and brutal siege warfare in Mariupol.”

Map Notes

To help you understand the maps better, here is a short guide to some of the symbology above the units. Russian units are in red. Ukrainian units are in green. Name of the unit is typically to the right of the symbol.

• Combined Arms Army (CAA) — Symbolized by XXXX above a unit on the map, the Army Group system was developed by the Soviets during World War II, when the echelons of corps and armies were merged together. Army Groups typically have at several motorized rifle and tank divisions and brigades; headquarters, artillery, air defense, reconnaissance, and MTO (logistics) brigades; and an engineering regiment and a NBC defense regiment. These formations have over 20,000 soldiers in them.

• Divisions — symbolized by XX above a unit on the map, these formations have about 8,500 soldiers and resemble Soviet-era divisions, with three motorized rifle regiments and one tank regiment (for a motorized rifle division (MRD)) or three tank regiments and one motorized rifle regiment (for a tank division) plus supporting units.

• Brigades — symbolized by X above a unit on the map, these formations typically have 3,000-4,500 soldiers

• Battalion Tactical Groups — symbolized by II above a unit on the map, these formations typically have 600 soldiers. See Invasion of Ukraine, D+15, SITREP for more details on the BTG.

Crowd Sourcing Battle Damage Assessment

The invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022. Each day the conflict continues, both Russian and Ukraine forces lose vehicles from combat. These vehicles were destroyed, damaged, abandoned, or captured in battle. Battle Damage Assessment, or BDA, is “the estimate of damage composed of physical and functional damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal military force.” In the old days, the Battalion or Brigade Intelligence Officer had to collect reports from helicopter pilots, Air Force pilots, forward observers, and ground forces who engaged the enemy. Based on these reports, the Intelligence Officer would make an assessment of how badly the enemy had been damaged from the actions of friendly forces.

Stijn Mitzer, along with Joost Oliemans, Kemal Janovsky, Dan Janovsky, and Jakub Janovsky, have taken this idea into the 21st Century. The five people are attempting to crowd source battle damage assessments in real-time from both the Russian and Ukraine armed forces during the invasion of Ukraine on The Oryx Website. The team finds photos of destroyed, abandoned, and captured vehicles and then tries to count them based on the vehicle type. They also categories them based on the vehicle being destroyed, abandoned, or captured. The team does its best to make sure that they are not counting the same vehicle twice and are updating it daily. Check it our yourself — the link to their regularly updated article is here.

Advanced BDA:

Just counting damaged, destroyed, and captured vehicles is Basic BDA. Taking the raw numbers and then assessing the impact on the invasion force is Advanced BDA. Advanced BDA helps military leaders understand the context and make better decisions.

The military uses three categories to measure the impact on enemy units: suppressed, neutralized, or destroyed. As you would expect, each of these terms has a military definition. These terms use the US Army’s Field Artillery percentages for suppressed, neutralized, or destroyed.

• Suppress is a tactical mission task that results in temporary degradation of the performance of a force or weapons system below the level needed to accomplish its mission. It is the lowest level and typically equates to 3% of a friendly or enemy unit’s equipment being destroyed, damaged, abandoned, or captured.

• Neutralize is a tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation. It is in the middle and usually equates to 10% of a friendly or enemy unit’s equipment being destroyed, damaged, abandoned, or captured.

• Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. It is the highest level and usually equals to 30% of a friendly or enemy unit’s equipment being destroyed, damaged, abandoned, or captured.

Russian BDA (As of March 18, 2022 at 15:00 EDT the Oryx Website)

Russian forces have lost:

• 236 Losses (23 ⬆️) out of an estimated 940x T-72/80/90s Tanks — 25.1% Losses (Neutralized)

  • Average of 11x tanks damaged, destroyed, abandoned and captured per day of the conflict

  • Estimate “Destroyed” or 30% losses on March 21, 2022

• 312 Losses (35 ⬆️ )out of an estimated 3,102x BMPs/BTRs/BMDs (Armored Personnel Carriers) — 10% Losses (Neutralized)

  • Average of 14x BMPs/BTRs damaged, destroyed, abandoned and captured per day of the conflict

  • Estimate “Neutralized” or 10% losses on March 18, 2022 ✅

• 4 Losses (2 ⬆️) out of an estimated 376x Shturm-S ATGM Carriers — 1% Losses (No impact)

• 43 Losses (3 ⬆️ )out of an estimated 282x BAT-2s and 188x IMR-2s (Engineer Vehicles) — 9.1% Losses (Suppressed)

• 88 Losses (12 ⬆️ )out of an estimated 564x 152 mm 2S19 Msta and 564x BM-21 122mm MLRS (Field Artillery) — 7.8% Losses (Suppressed)

• 43 Losses (4 ⬆️ ) out of an estimated 564x Pantsir-S1 (SAMs) — 7.6% Losses (Suppressed)

• 91 MT-LB Losses (6 ⬆️) out of an estimated 658x MT-LB ACRV (Command and Control) — 13.8% Losses (Neutralized)

  • Average of 4x MT-LBs damaged, destroyed, abandoned and captured per day of the conflict

The latest US estimates of Russian casualties are around 4,750 soldiers killed. Remember casualties in war are killed, wounded, and captured. This would also imply that there are 25,000 Russian soldiers wounded or captured. (This figure uses the 1:5 killed to wounded ratio that the Soviet Union experienced in Afghanistan from 1979-1989.) I think this number might be a bit high, however, there were open source reports this week that Russia is moving soldiers from across the country to replace the soldiers that they have lost in the invasion.

Ukrainian BDA (As of March 18, 2022 at 1500 EDT the Oryx Website)

I believe these numbers are low since the Russian forces are not using social media and it makes it difficult for the Oryx team to crowd source the data. However, it is a good start point. So far, according to Oryx, Ukrainian forces have lost:

• 66 Losses (1 ⬆️ ) out of an estimated 630x T-64/80s Tanks — 10.5% Losses (Neutralized)

  • Average of 3x tanks damaged, destroyed, abandoned and captured per day of the conflict.

• 96 Losses (15 ⬆️) out of an estimated 2,215x BMPs/BTRs/BMDs (Armored Personnel Carriers) — 4.3% Losses (Suppressed)

  • Average of 4x BMPs/BTRs damaged, destroyed, abandoned and captured per day of the conflict.

• 28 Losses (2 ⬆️ ) out of an estimated 306x 152 mm 2S19 Msta and 306x BM-21 122mm MLRS (Field Artillery) — 4.5% Losses (Suppressed)

• 9 MT-LB Losses (1 ⬆️ ) out of an estimated 476x MT-LB ACRV (Command and Control) — 1.9% Losses (No Impact)

President Zelenskyy said over the weekend that over 1,300 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed (US estimates were 3,000). Remember casualties in war are killed, wounded, and captured. This would also imply that there are about 6,500 Ukrainian soldiers wounded or captured. This uses the same ratio (1 killed to 5 wounded/captured) from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. This number does not include civilian casualties.

Background Information on Both the Russian Invasion Force and Ukrainian Defense Forces Can Be Found at:

Invasion of Ukraine, D+19, SITREP

Invasion of Ukraine, D+15, SITREP

BTGs, OoB, and Crowd Sourced BDA in Ukraine, D+11

Conclusion

Want even more? Reach out to me me here for a virtual talk to your group or company on the Invasion of Ukraine and its tactical and strategic implications.

Want something different? In my day job, I’m an executive coach and leadership consultant. I published a book last summer on how to develop your perseverance and accomplish your goals — Grow Your Grit, available for sale at Amazon.

Use your deeper awareness of the invasion of Ukraine to go on the offensive and follow the conflict with better.