Invasion of Ukraine, D+82 SITREP (#214)
Today, May 17, 2022, is D+82 in the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. This blog post discusses measuring the combat effectiveness of Russian and Ukrainian forces during the last 82 days and continues the crowd sourced Battle Damage Assessment update of Phase II of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine.
Combat Effectiveness
Trevor DuPuy was an officer, prolific writer, and historian who lived from 1916 to 1995. A 1938 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, he fought in Burma in World War II as an artillery officer where he commanded a U.S. Army artillery battalion, a Chinese artillery group, and an artillery detachment from the British 36th Infantry Division. After the war, he retired from the military and led several think tanks. He developed several models for modeling war including the Quantified Judgment Method and the Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model. Out of his 50 books, his most influential book was Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties And Equipment Losses In Modern War.
During his career, DuPuy put a lot of thought into understanding the historic effectiveness of military units in combat and developing tools to model future combat based on that research. At its most basic form, the effectiveness of a unit or nation in combat can be measured through three factors: mission accomplishment, casualty effectiveness, and spatial effectiveness. Mission effectiveness is simply a measurement of who won or lost. DuPuy thought of it in a 0-10 score with sub-scores (from 0-2) for conceptual accomplishment, geographical accomplishment, block hostile mission, command and staff performance, and troop performance. Casualty effectiveness is a ratio of casualties inflicted versus casualties suffered. Remember that casualties include all those killed, wounded, captured, or missing in the conflict. Finally, spatial effectiveness is the amount of territory gained on the offensive or territory lost in the defense. This is typically expressed in kilometers per day.
I thought it would be fun to look at the effectiveness of both sides in the Russian Invasion of Ukraine using these definitions:
Russian Combat Effectiveness —
Mission Accomplishment (0-10): 2
Conceptual Accomplishment (0-2) — 0
Geographical Accomplishment (0-2) — 1
Block Hostile Mission (0-2) — 0
Command and Staff Performance (0-2) — 0
Troop Performance (0-2) — 1
Casualty Effectiveness: Since casualties are unknown at this time, I will use the ratio of vehicles destroyed, abandoned, or captured provided by Oryx Website between the two sides.
As of May 15, 2022 1,045 Total Ukrainian Vehicles Lost : 3,675 Total Russian Vehicles Lost or a 1 : 3.5 ratio.
Since tanks are the “pacing item” of this war, as of May 15, 2022, 163 Total Ukrainian Tanks Lost : 671 Total Russian Tanks Lost or a 1 : 4.1 ratio
Spatial Effectiveness:
Total size of Ukraine incl. Crimea and Donbas: 603,628 km2
Size of Russian occupied Ukrainian territory until February 24, 2022 (incl. Crimea and part of Donbas): 44,000 km2 or approximately 7.3% of Ukraine.
As of April 12, 2022, Russia had occupied an additional 6,500 km2, down from 9,500 km2 in mid-March. Russia had seized an average of 138.3 km2 per day. This is 8.4% of Ukraine if you include the previously occupied territory.
Ukrainian Combat Effectiveness —
Mission Accomplishment (0-10): 7
Conceptual Accomplishment (0-2) — 1
Geographical Accomplishment (0-2)— 1
Block Hostile Mission (0-2) — 2
Command and Staff Performance (0-2)— 1
Troop Performance (0-2)— 2
Casualty Effectiveness: Since casualties are unknown at this time, I will use the ratio of vehicles destroyed, abandoned, or captured provided by Oryx Website between the two sides.
As of May 15, 2022 1,045 Total Ukrainian Vehicles : 3,675 Total Russian vehicles or a 1 : 3.5 ratio.
Since tanks are the “pacing item” of this war, as of May 15, 2022, 163 Total Ukrainian Tanks : 671 Total Russian Tanks or a 1 : 4.1 ratio
Spatial Effectiveness:
Total size of Ukraine incl. Crimea and Donbas: 603,628 km2
Size of Russian occupied Ukrainian territory until February 24, 2022 (including Crimea and part of Donbas): 44,000 km2 or approximately 7.3% of Ukraine.
As of April 12, 2022, Russia had occupied an additional 6,500 km2, down from 9,500 km2 in mid-March. Ukraine has given up an average of 138.3 km2 per day. This is 8.4% of Ukraine if you include the previously occupied territory.
Current Situation — Big Picture
Here is Jomini of the West’s (Twitter @JominiW) latest map of the current situation (May 10, 2022). As he states, “The past 100 hours has seen the Ukrainian military expand on the initial success of its limited counteroffensive around Kharkiv. Russia’s offensive along the Siverskyi Donets Line has generally stalled, with limited successes in Popasna.”
Current Situation — Donetsk Oblast, May 7, 2022
Here is Jomini of the West’s (Twitter @JominiW) map of the current situation in Donetsk (May 10, 2022). As he states, “Russian forces have managed to seize control of Popasna, Nyzhnie, and Velyka Kormyshuvakha. However, offensive efforts in other sectors of the Donbas remain stalled and ineffectual. Russian forces may be preparing to shift priority of axes.”
Russian BDA (As of May 16, 2022 at 15:00 EDT the Oryx Website (Only captures losses from April 9 onwards))
Tracking the Russian BDA in Phase II (the battle in eastern Ukraine) is a combination of art and science. From April 9, 2022, I believe that Russian forces have lost over 600 vehicles in Phase II. Key vehicles lost include:
195 Losses (28 ⬆️) out of an estimated 675x T-72/80/90s Tanks — 28.9% Losses (Neutralized)
Average of 5.6x tanks damaged, destroyed, abandoned and captured per day of Phase II
278 Losses (31 ⬆️ )out of an estimated 2,227x BMPs/BTRs/BMDs (Armored Personnel Carriers) — 12.5% Losses (Neutralized)
Average of 8.2x BMPs/BTRs damaged, destroyed, abandoned and captured per day of Phase II
35 Losses (3 ⬆️ ) out of an estimated 282x BAT-2s and 188x IMR-2s (Engineer Vehicles) — 9.5% Losses (Suppressed)
41 Losses (11 ⬆️ ) out of an estimated 405x 152 mm 2S19 Msta and 405x BM-21 122mm MLRS (Field Artillery) — 5.1% Losses (Suppressed)
11 Losses (4 ⬆️ ) out of an estimated 202x Pantsir-S1 (SAMs/ADA) — 5.4% Losses (Suppressed)
73 MT-LB Losses (10 ⬆️) out of an estimated 472x MT-LB ACRV (Command and Control) — 15.5% Losses (Neutralized)
There have not been regular updates or reports on casualties. Until there are updated reports, I will continue to provide this for some perspective:
On April 25, 2022 the UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace stated that “over 15,000 Russian soldiers were killed in Ukraine.”
In addition, there may be another 30,000 Russian soldiers wounded, captured, or missing. Casualties are all soldiers killed, wounded, captured, or missing. With an estimated 190,000 Russian soldiers participating in the invasion — this would represent 23.6% casualties (which, by the way, is in line with the total amount of key ground vehicles lost by the Russian Army).
Ukrainian BDA (As of May 16, 2022 at 1500 EDT the Oryx Website)
I did not reset the Ukrainian data for Phase II. However, it is a good start point to understand how things are going for Ukraine. So far, according to Oryx, Ukrainian forces have lost:
163 Losses (8 ⬆️ ) out of an estimated 630x T-64/80s Tanks — 25.9% Losses (Neutralized)
232 Losses (No Change) out of an estimated 2,215x BMPs/BTRs/BMDs (Armored Personnel Carriers) — 10.4% Losses (Neutralized)
74 Losses (3 ⬆️) out of an estimated 306x 152 mm 2S19 Msta and 306x BM-21 122mm MLRS (Field Artillery) — 12.1% Losses (Neutralized)
15 MT-LB Losses (No Change) out of an estimated 476x MT-LB ACRV (Command and Control) — 3.1% Losses (Suppressed)
Once again, there have not been regular updates or reports on casualties. Until there are updated reports, I will continue to provide this for some perspective:
President Zelenskyy said during an April 15, 2022 interview with CNN that over 2,750 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed (US estimates were 3,000) and over 10,000 wounded. This number does not include civilian casualties.
More Information on the Conflict:
Invasion of Ukraine, D+75, SITREP
Leading During the Crisis in Ukraine and D+67 SITREP
Invasion of Ukraine, D+60, SITREP
Invasion of Ukraine, D+53, SITREP
BTGs, OoB, and Crowd Sourced BDA in Ukraine, D+11
Conclusion
Want even more? Reach out to me me here for a virtual talk to your group or company on the Invasion of Ukraine and its tactical and strategic implications. Just did a great talk with some banking executives from the midwest.
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Use your deeper awareness of the invasion of Ukraine to go on the offensive and follow the conflict with better insight.