Invasion of Ukraine, August 2023 SITREP (#276)
Today, August 1, 2023, is D+523 in the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. This is the 36th in my series on blog posts on the war — see all the war in Ukraine blog posts here. For those of you who have been following TFCG’s posts on Ukraine, I post once a month at the beginning of each month on the war. Today’s post updates the crowd sourced Battle Damage Assessment for the month of July 2023.
Three takeaways today — Ukraine’s counteroffensive has started, Ukraine’s losses in the offense are higher than they were in the defense (which is normal), and no analyst has a good handle on how well or poorly the offensive is going.
Yesterday, the Oryx Website reported that Russia has lost 2,173 tanks (93 since the last blog post — more than what Russia lost in June) since the war began.
Here is another historic perspective on tank losses. From June 6, 1944 through May 15, 1945 (343 Days) the United States lost ~7,000 (including ~4,347 M4 Sherman Tanks) tanks in the European Theater of Operations (think D-Day to the end of the war in northern Europe). That’s an average of 20.5 tanks per day. The Russians lost 3.3 tanks per day in Ukraine in the last 34 days and 4.2 tanks per day since the war began.
Future of Artillery?
In large scale combat operations (or for you old school people — high intensity combat), counter-battery fire (also called counter-fire) is a battlefield tactic used to defeat the enemy's indirect fire elements which include rocket launchers, artillery, and mortars. Counter-battery fire uses radar to detect incoming indirect fire, calculates its point of origin, and then sends the location data to other artillery which attempts to fire on the enemy positions before they can reposition (the "scoot" part of shoot-and-scoot tactics). Both Ukraine’s and Russia’s military have used counter-battery fire against each other since the war began.
The War in Ukraine has given western militaries some unique insight into the strengths and weaknesses of their weapon systems, as well as a glimpse at the future battlefield and its tactics. Here is one glimpse at the war in Ukraine which may have implications for NATO/US artillery systems going forward.
The joint United Kingdom-United States M777 Lightweight Towed Howitzer is a $3 Million howitzer that can fire a 155mm projectile up to 36 kilometers. With a five person crew, as the name suggests, the M777 must get towed into position by a truck, emplaced, fire, and then get attached to the vehicle to move to another location. The United States Army likes the M777 because in addition to being moved by a truck, it can be transported (slung underneath) a CH-47 helicopter. With it being towed, it takes approximately 2:30 to set up the howitzer for firing and 2:30 to break it down to get it ready to move. The M777 can sustain a rate of fire of 2-4 rounds per minute.
The French Camion Équipé d'un Système d'Artillerie (English: "Truck equipped with an artillery system"), or CAESAR, is a French $8 Million self-propelled howitzer that is installed on a 6x6 or 8x8 truck chassis and can shoot 155mm projectile up to 36 kilometers. Operated by a crew of five, the CAESAR was designed for shoot-and-scoot tactics — it takes around 60 seconds to be ready to fire and 40 seconds to depart after the rounds leave the tube. It can sustain a rate of fire of up to six rounds per minute.
Over the past year, Ukraine received at least 152 M777 howitzers. As of yesterday, they have lost at least 60. This is a 39% loss rate. The Ukrainian military received 49 CAESAR self-propelled howitzers. To date they have lost 3 — a 6% loss rate.
So why the disparity in the losses between the systems? First, Ukrainian tactics — Ukraine may be “shooting and scooting” the CEASARs more than the M777s. Second, training — Ukraine may have received more training at quickly firing and moving the CEASARs than the M777s. Third, Ukraine may value the CEASARs more than the M777 so is more risk averse with the CEASARs. Finally, the 2:30 that it takes to emplace and break down the M777 versus the under a minute for the CEASAR may not be fast enough for the modern battlefield and the speed of counter-battery fire.
The disparity in the losses between the two systems begs a couple of questions. Are towed howitzers still relevant in large scale combat operations? Should the US Army light divisions (82nd Airborne, 101st Airborne, 10th Mountain, 25th Infantry Division, etc.) consider trading in their M777s for a wheeled, self-propelled howitzer going forward? Finally, should US Army and US Marine M777 artillery soldiers practice rapidly emplacing, firing, and moving their howitzer — certainly.
Total Russian BDA (As of July 31, 2023 at 1500 EDT) From the Oryx Website (Captures total losses from February 24, 2022 onwards)
Key vehicles lost include:
2,173x T-62/72/80/90s Tanks Destroyed, Captured, or Abandoned (93 ⬆️ — all change numbers since July 3, 2023)
Average of 4.2x tanks damaged, destroyed, abandoned and captured per day since the invasion started
3,156x BMPs/BTRs/BMDs (Armored Personnel Carriers) Destroyed, Captured, or Abandoned (143 ⬆️ )
Average of 6.0x BMPs/BTRs damaged, destroyed, abandoned and captured per day since the invasion started
327x Engineer Vehicles Destroyed, Captured, or Abandoned (11 ⬆️ )
982x Indirect Fire Systems (Mortars, Howitzers, and Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems) Destroyed, Captured, or Abandoned (84 ⬆️ )
186x Air Defense Weapon Systems Destroyed, Captured, or Abandoned (24 ⬆️ )
671x MT-LBs (Command and Control) Destroyed, Captured, or Abandoned (53 ⬆️)
Ukrainian BDA (As of July 31, 2023 at 1500 EDT From the Oryx Website)
So far, Ukrainian forces have lost:
592x T-64/72/80 Tanks Destroyed, Captured, or Abandoned (⬆️ 35 since 3 JUL)
Average of 1.1x tanks damaged, destroyed, abandoned and captured per day since the invasion started
1041x BMP/BTR/BMD (Armored Personnel Carriers) Destroyed, Captured, or Abandoned (⬆️ 80)
378x Indirect Fire Systems (Howitzers and MRLS) Destroyed, Captured, or Abandoned (⬆️ 32)
87x MT-LB ACRV (Command and Control) Destroyed, Captured, or Abandoned (No Change)
For More Information on the Conflict:
BTGs, OoB, and Crowd Sourced BDA in Ukraine, D+11
Conclusion
Want even more? Reach out to me me here for a virtual talk to your group or company on the Invasion of Ukraine and its tactical and strategic implications.
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In the meantime, use your deeper awareness of the invasion of Ukraine to go on the offensive and follow the conflict with better insight.